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1 Introduction
The twentieth century was the worst ever in terms
of famine mortality, yet it was also the historical
moment when the technical capacity to eradicate
famine was first achieved, and when famine was
seemingly ended in many historically famine-prone
countries – Russia, China, India, Bangladesh.
Depressingly, at the start of the twenty-first century,
famine persists. It remains endemic in the Horn of
Africa – Ethiopia and Sudan have both suffered
mass mortality famines within the last five years –
it seems to be spreading to parts of Africa that were
previously famine-free and it remains to be seen
whether the North Korea famine during the 1990s
was an aberration (the last ever ‘central planning’
famine) or the harbinger of something new.
Why does famine persist? Are the ‘new famines’ more
‘political’ than historical famines, or are we simply
recognising the centrality of political factors more
than before? What do recent food crises in Ethiopia,
Iraq, Madagascar, Malawi and Sudan tell us about the
future trajectory of famine? What lessons can we
draw from recent successes in containing or averting
famine – in Bangladesh, Bosnia, Mongolia – for a new
famine prevention policy agenda? These are some of
the questions that this Bulletin, through an analysis of
these and other case studies, tries to address.
This Introduction sets the context for the articles
that follow. It starts with an overview of twentieth
century famines, considering both trends in
mortality and trajectories in terms of causal
triggers. Next we examine recent ‘hidden’ and
‘unexpected’ famines, and argue that our evolving
thinking on famine has failed to adequately
incorporate the ‘globalisation’ of famine processes
and actors. Finally, the contributed articles to this
Bulletin are introduced.
2 Famine mortality1
‘Excess mortality’ is the most severe consequence of
famine, and is a generally accepted indicator of a
famine’s severity. Figures 1 and 2 present summary
famine mortality estimates for the twentieth century,
by decade and region. These figures are often
contested and are subject to both overestimation
and underreporting errors, so should be regarded as
indicative rather than definitive. For instance, the
figures of 30 million and 3 million, respectively for
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the China ‘Great Leap Forward’ famine (1959/62)
and North Korea (1990s) are based on very limited
data, and may be overestimates. Conversely, for
many famines, no mortality estimates are available –
e.g. drought famines in northern Nigeria (1927 and
1942/3) – while deaths in many ‘war famines’
(Angola 1974/6, 1993/4, 2001/2; Zaire 1977/8,
1997; Liberia 1992/3; Sierra Leone 1995/8) are
impossible to attribute to either conflict or famine.
Given these reservations, available estimates suggest
that between 70 million and 80 million people died
in famines during the twentieth century – certainly
the highest total for any century in history (though
global populations were considerably smaller in the
past).
Striking patterns can be deduced about the pattern
of twentieth century famine mortality, both
geographically and over time. First, three distinct
periods can be identified (Figure 1). In the first two
decades of the century mortality was very low and
confined to Africa (following the enormous
famines in China and India of the late nineteenth
century). Over 85 per cent of famine deaths were
clustered in the middle five decades,
predominantly in China and the Soviet Union, and
a further 12 per cent occurred since the 1970s, all
in Africa and South/Southeast Asia.
Second, famine was steadily rolled back over the
decades, from the northern hemisphere and Asia to
sub-Saharan Africa, where it remains firmly
entrenched – indeed, since the 1980s, famine
appears to have taken up permanent residence in
the Horn. The last famine in Europe occurred in the
Soviet Union immediately after the Second World
War, the last famine in China was a by-product of
the Great Leap Forward of 1958/62, and the last
famine in South Asia (to date) occurred in
Bangladesh in 1974. Occasionally famine strikes in
Southeast Asia (Cambodia in the 1970s, North
Korea in the 1990s), but famine as an endemic
problem in Asia and Europe seems to have been
consigned to history. The grim label ‘land of famine’
has left China, Russia, India and Bangladesh, and
since the 1970s has resided in Ethiopia and Sudan.
Third, this shift has been associated with a
dramatic drop in famine mortality, mainly because
vulnerable populations are much smaller in Africa
than in Asia. Deaths in the worst African famines
are counted in the hundreds of thousands rather
than the millions. All 11 of the twentieth century
famines that claimed more than a million lives
occurred in Asia and Europe. The biggest of all
twentieth century African famines – Ethiopia in the
mid-1980s – killed less than 1 million people, and
total mortality in all 19 African famines listed in
Figure 2 amounted to just over 4 million. By
contrast, just three Soviet Union famines claimed
18–19 million lives and five Chinese famines killed
over 40 million. Most sobering, though, is the
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Figure 1: Twentieth century famine mortality by decade
finding that millions of people have died in famines
every decade since the 1920s.
The twenty-first century started with famines whose
death toll is counted in the thousands (Malawi 2002)
or tens of thousands (Ethiopia 2000). This might
suggest that the scale of mortality in famines is
continuing to fall, but within the last decade alone
70,000 southern Sudanese and up to 3 million North
Koreans died in famines. As of mid-2002, Angola is
emerging from a protracted conflict-related famine,
southern Africa is entering its second year of food
crisis, Mongolia stands on the brink of disaster (see
Siurua and Swift, in this Bulletin) and vulnerability in
the Horn of Africa is as high as it ever was. Moreover,
given that the nature of famine appears to be shifting
and new sources of vulnerability are emerging, there
is no empirical basis for extrapolating trends – either
optimistic or pessimistic – for the unfolding century.
3 Famine trajectories
Most twentieth century famines were triggered by
one (or a combination) of three factors: (1) natural
disasters – severe droughts (mainly in Africa),
floods (South Asia) or frozen winters (Eastern
Europe and Central Asia); (2) malevolent exercise
of state power – the Soviet Union and China being
paradigmatic; (3) conflict – especially in sub-
Saharan Africa, since the 1960s. These threats to
food production or availability were usually
compounded by poverty (‘entitlement failure’) and
by market and relief/intervention failures, such that
generalised or localised declines in food availability
were not compensated by trade or aid flows.
Even in earlier centuries, famines always had
political dimensions, but most were triggered by
natural disasters that operated in contexts where
local economies were weak (subsistence oriented,
locally based, unintegrated with wider markets) and
the political will and logistical capacity to intervene
were lacking. Some writers have highlighted the
strength of pre-capitalist communities in buffering
weaker members against livelihood threats –
through ‘moral economy’ redistribution (Watts
1983) – but it is now recognised that these informal
insurance mechanisms provided limited resilience
against severe covariant shocks.
During the colonial period in Africa and Asia,
natural triggers persisted and ‘political vulnerability’
to famine initially increased, a result of violent
resistance in many countries in response to which
the colonisers often used famine as a weapon (Davis
2001). Thereafter, macroeconomic and political
vulnerability to famine gradually diminished, due
to the development of communications and
transport infrastructure, together with the initiation
of early warning systems and relief intervention
mechanisms by colonial administrations which
recognised the need to ameliorate food crises to
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Figure 2: Twentieth century famine mortality by region
achieve some political legitimacy. As a result of this
combination of ‘effective government, good
transport, wider markets and some increase in
average wealth’ (Iliffe 1987: 158), the late colonial
period in Africa and Asia saw a decline in the
number of mass mortality famines and a reduction
in the scale of mortality following natural disasters.
Before the Second World War, there had been no
mass mortality famines in South Asia since 1900
and only one in Africa between 1917 and 1957.
The development of transport and communications
infrastructure did much to reduce vulnerability to
famine, even if ‘natural triggers’, such as droughts or
floods persisted. In northern China, where 9–13
million people died during a protracted drought in
the 1870s, similar conditions prevailed in the early
1920s, but thanks to greatly improved
communications and the construction of 6,000
miles of railway in the interim, relief intervention
was prompt and mortality was restricted to half a
million (Mallory 1926). Similar processes of
infrastructure development and integration of
historically famine-prone regions with the national
economy are credited with reducing vulnerability to
‘natural disaster’ famines in India and the Soviet
Union. The Soviet famines of the 1920s to 1940s
were entirely attributable to punitive economic
policies (agricultural collectivisation, grain seizures
by the state), war, and Stalin’s genocidal policies
against the Ukraine. Similarly, China’s ‘Great Leap
Forward’ famine of the early 1960s and North
Korea’s famine of the late 1990s were products of an
authoritarian, unaccountable centralised state.
Some African famines share this characteristic, such
as those occurring in Ethiopia under the reign of
Emperor Haile Selassie and the Marxist Dergue
regime that succeeded him.
In Africa, the development of transport infrastructure
was slower and patchier than in Europe and parts of
Asia – indeed, poor roads remain a contributory
factor in several recent famines, exacerbated during
conflicts by landmines and attacks on bridges and
vehicles, including relief convoys. Nonetheless, the
lorry has been described as ‘a vital weapon against
famine’, in Africa. Microeconomic vulnerability due
to household-level poverty and fragmented markets
persisted, however, with a shift in famine causation
being attributed to a shift from ‘food availability
decline’ to ‘exchange entitlement decline’. Marxist
writers of the 1970s (cf. Meillassoux 1974) pointed
to the penetration of capitalism into subsistence-
oriented economies during the colonial period – the
commodification of food, the expansion of cash
cropping – as heightening the vulnerability of
peasants to natural disasters or economic shocks, but
with hindsight these vulnerabilities now appear to
have been transitional and the benefits of
incorporation into national and global markets are
regarded as generally outweighing the risks – at least
in terms of reducing vulnerability to famine.2
After independence, historically famine-prone
countries took one of two routes. Some, like India,
continued to make progress in reducing vulnerability
factors, specifically in the category of political
vulnerability. Following the colonial administration’s
gross failure to prevent the Bengal famine in 1943,
India’s ‘political contract’ (discussed below) made the
government accountable for famine prevention,
while improvements in food production associated
with Green Revolution technologies reduced
household food insecurity, culminating in the
apparent eradication of famine in India by the early
1970s. On the other hand, microeconomic
vulnerability to famine associated with the
incorporation of the poor into weak markets
persisted, and a catastrophic famine triggered by a
minor natural disaster (floods) combined with major
market failure (speculation in and hoarding of rice)
occurred in Bangladesh in 1974.
In stark contrast to Asia’s success in eradicating
‘famines that kill’ during the twentieth century, in
many African countries independence was associated
with increased political instability and the emergence
of famines where militarisation, counter-insurgency
and civil war played major roles. These countries saw
a rise in political vulnerability and a radical shift in
the nature of famine. After a lengthy period of low
famine incidence between the 1920s and 1950s,
military dictatorships replaced the colonial
administration in much of Africa, conflicts over the
post-colonial settlement developed in many
countries, and the modern era of war-triggered
famines began, the first significant case being Biafra –
a region of Nigeria which had not previously been
vulnerable to famine, and has not been since – in the
1960s. During the 1980s and 1990s a number of
African countries that were not historically ‘famine-
prone’ suffered conflict-triggered food crises (Angola
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and Mozambique, Liberia and Sierra Leone, Zaire),
while others that had been susceptible to drought-
triggered famines experienced ‘complex emergencies’
(Ethiopia and Sudan) in which the roles of drought
and civil instability were difficult to disentangle.
Since the drought-triggered African famines of the
mid-1980s, information systems and international
response capacity have improved exponentially, to
the point where ‘natural disaster’ famines should be
entirely preventable. But both Ethiopia and Malawi
have suffered food crises recently that were
triggered by bad weather and resulted in heavy loss
of life (see Maxwell and Devereux, in this Bulletin).
And it will always remain the case that famines
where war is a factor are extremely difficult to
predict and even more difficult to prevent (see Deng
on Sudan and Watson on Bosnia, in this Bulletin).
We have argued above that the evolution of famine
in recent centuries has varied in different parts of
the world. While improvements in infrastructure
and political accountability have contributed to its
prevention in Asia in recent decades, famines have
occurred more frequently in Africa because of
increasingly complex negative synergies between
natural triggers (drought, flood), economic
vulnerability (poverty, fragmented markets) and
political culpability (war, government policies,
failures of international response). Future famines
may continue to evolve in ways that reflect the
increasing complexity of the contemporary world,
or they may be different from famines of the past –
or (ideally, but unlikely) they may soon be
consigned to the dustbin of history. The next
section examines the potential implications of
globalisation processes for these trajectories. 
4 ‘Hidden’ famines, ‘unexpected’
famines, and the changing global
context3
In the 1990s, in the aftermath of the Cold War and
amid a seeming proliferation of civil conflict, the
complex political emergency (CPE) approach to
famine analysis gained increasing prominence. By
identifying civil conflict or war as a principle cause of
famines, the CPE approach directed attention to
places of endemic civil strife (and Africa in particular)
as the most likely location of famine. This focus,
however, may have led us to overlook other possible
scenarios that diverge from this one, in either
causation or geographic location. Several case studies
in this Bulletin describe famines (or near famines) that
occurred in unusual places (Mongolia), for
unprecedented reasons (Iraq), or without receiving
substantial or even any international attention
(Ethiopia, Madagascar). These ‘unexpected’ and
‘hidden’ famines raise important questions. Why are
crises happening in unexpected places and for
unexpected reasons? Does current theory adequately
explain their occurrence? How and why have the
hidden famines been overlooked? In trying to answer
these questions, we argue that famine theory has not
fully come to terms with the rapidly changing global
context in which contemporary famines occur.
Several events and trends may have particular
relevance to the way we understand the famine
process.
4.1 The rise of international
humanitarianism
Globalisation has produced an array of
supranational, international, and local actors that are
increasingly appropriating the authority of the state
in the South, both from ‘above’ and ‘below’ (Duffield
2000). The proliferation since the Second World
War, of humanitarian agencies – the United Nations,
bilateral and multilateral donors and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) – means that in
virtually all poor countries the international
community has taken on itself the role of food
security guarantor. While this broadens the range of
actors involved in famine management, and
increases the available resources, it has also resulted
in a diffusion of responsibility for famine prevention
– ‘there is a “black hole” of unaccountability at the
heart of the international relief system’ (IDS 2002).
If it is true that ‘famine is caused by failures of
political accountability’ (de Waal 1997: 85), then
national governments, international governments
and humanitarian organisations must share
responsibility for the persistence of famines (see
Maxwell on Ethiopia, in this Bulletin). In Africa,
where the post-independence state has generally
been too strong or too weak to respond effectively to
its citizens’ needs, the limitations of the ‘diffused
accountability’ model are all too clear: in most cases
when famines happen, no government is thrown out
of power, no politician is tried for genocide, no
donor agency officials lose their jobs.
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4.2 The collapse of the Soviet Bloc and
the ascendancy of the United States
In the aftermath of the Cold War, two key political
developments have been the collapse of Soviet
influence and the emergence of the United States as
the world’s only superpower. North Korea’s
economic dependence on the Soviet Union was a
major contributory factor to the famine that
occurred during the 1990s, only a few years after
the withdrawal of Soviet transfers and subsidies.
The collapse of the socialist system in Mongolia has
contributed to the increased vulnerability of
pastoralists (see Siurua and Swift, in this Bulletin).
The United States’ military, political and economic
power allows it to exert disproportionate influence
in countries where it feels its strategic interests are
at stake, whether in the form of economic
sanctions, withholding food aid, or even military
intervention. In pursuit of its foreign policy goals,
the United States has contributed to the famine
process in Bangladesh in 1974, Ethiopia in 1984
and Iraq in the 1990s (see Gazdar, in this Bulletin),
while its military intervention in Afghanistan in
2001–2 very nearly precipitated a famine.
4.3 Globalisation of financial systems
and trade
The globalisation of international trade and
financial systems has had a number of implications
in famine-prone countries. First, international
institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF
have a great deal of influence over the economic
policies of developing countries, and may prescribe
policies which, being driven by macroeconomic
concerns and prioritising economic growth rather
than household food security, may inadvertently
raise vulnerability to famine (see Devereux on
Malawi, in this Bulletin). Second, the exports of
developing countries depend on international
markets and the terms of trade agreements, but
powerful trading partners seek to negotiate
favourable terms for themselves. Third,
international corporations may have significant
financial interests in a country and contribute,
intentionally or not, to policies that may lead to
famine. For example, international oil companies
that have invested in the Sudan are providing
revenue to the government, which is fighting a civil
war that has led to famine in the south (see Deng,
in this Bulletin).
4.4 Information technology and the
role of the media
Technological advances that have revolutionised
global access to information have accelerated in the
last 20 years, with the development of satellite
television, mobile phones, the Internet and e-mail.
Network media provide live coverage of
‘newsworthy’ events (the ‘CNN factor’), the Internet
provides instant access to early warning
information, e-mail offers immediate communic-
ation to almost anywhere in the world. Since the
‘Band Aid’ phenomenon in 1984, television has
helped to shape a global conscience, in which
people far from a famine feel emotionally involved
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Figure 3: Salience and famine vulnerability
and even responsible for the suffering they are
viewing. However, three caveats are important.
First, the flow of information is invariably
‘unidirectional’ – from ‘victims’ at the ‘periphery’ to
‘donors’ at the ‘centre’. Second, journalists edit and
package material to reflect the needs and priorities
of their employers. Third, media representations of
famine tend to reinforce stereotypes rather than
advance understanding, because the media
instinctively favours simple explanations and
narratives over complexity and ambiguity.
4.5 Salience
One emerging dynamic that is increasingly relevant
in a globalising world, but not yet well understood,
is how and why certain crises achieve ‘salience’, i.e.
international attention and priority, while others do
not. The concept is particularly useful for
understanding ‘hidden’ famines. Figure 3 maps the
relationship of salience to vulnerability under
several simple scenarios. In the ‘ideal’ scenario, the
salience of an impending crisis increases more
quickly than the vulnerability of the affected
population, and an intervention takes place that
reduces (or turns back the curve of) vulnerability
before there is concentrated mortality (for
examples of ‘averted famines’, see Eldridge on
southern Africa, and Watson on Bosnia, in this
Bulletin). A more ‘typical’ scenario is that
vulnerability increases to the point of concentrated
mortality, which in turn triggers interest and a
corresponding increase in salience (for example,
Ethiopia in 1984 and southern Sudan 1998). In a
‘hidden’ famine, by contrast, the onset and
evolution of the crisis, even including mass
mortality, are not associated with a concomitant
rise in the attention given to the affected area, and
it remains unknown to the international
community (for an example of a ‘hidden’ famine,
see Garenne on Madagascar, in this Bulletin).
4.6 Intellectual discourse and the
‘academisation’ of famine studies
The establishment of ‘development studies’ as a
discipline in Northern universities has led to a
proliferation of academic work on food security
and famine, and partly explains recent advances in
famine theorising. Researchers who write about
famine, whether or not they come into direct
contact with people affected by famine, frame their
theories and shape aid policies by drawing on the
dominant intellectual currents of their time. The
rights discourse, for example, has achieved
particular prominence in recent years and its
limitations and strengths are beginning to affect the
way food security programs are discussed,
designed and delivered. Other relevant paradigms
are globalisation, post-modernism, gender studies
and situational ethics.
4.7 Advances in biotechnology
Recent scientific developments, pioneered in the
North, could have major implications for food
security in the South. In this context, claims that
genetic modification of crops could revolutionise
food production are currently being subjected to
critical scrutiny (see Scoones, in this Bulletin). The
scientists and corporations involved in the
development of GMOs have a number of
conflicting interests to weigh, before their products
have any possibility of either being relevant or
being made available to poor farmers in famine-
prone areas.
4.8 Global pandemics and global
warming
l The HIV/AIDS pandemic has numerous
immediate and potential implications for food
security at household, national and global
levels, all of these negative (see de Waal on
‘AIDS-related national crises’, in this Bulletin).
l The likely consequence of the global warming
that is currently occurring include more
unstable weather patterns, increasing the
likelihood of drought and flooding in famine-
prone countries. The causes of global warming
appear to be related to worldwide CO2
emissions, with a substantial proportion
coming from wealthy countries that are not
famine-prone.
4.9 International justice
The functioning of the International War Crimes
Tribunal in the Hague and the recent establishment
of the International Criminal Court have set
precedents for the use (and, some would worry,
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abuse) of international legal systems to enforce
accountability for violations of international law.
These developments have led to calls for the
criminalisation of mass starvation, as a potential
way of making governments and other relevant
actors answerable when a famine occurs (see
Edkins, in this Bulletin). 
Taken together, these trends and events suggest
that a broad range of actors (coming from different
intellectual and political environments) may have
an interest in and influence on the famine process
in countries other than their own. Yet recent theory
has largely ignored this global level of analysis.
Sen’s entitlement approach (1981) focused on the
conditions of the affected individual or household.
Complex emergency theory, with its emphasis on
conflict and winners and losers (Keen 1994),
concentrated attention on the failure of the state.
Likewise, social contract analyses identified the
central problem as inadequate accountability
between the government and citizens (de Waal
1997). 
To a certain extent, each of these Northern
approaches externalises the famine process, that is,
they locate famine in a ‘remote’ area and delimit the
relevant actors (at least in the onset and
perpetuation of the crisis) to citizens of the
countries in which they are occurring. Other
stakeholders – including the international media,
donors, international institutions, corporations,
regional traders, academics, scientists, aid workers
– are peripheral: sometimes attempting to
ameliorate a situation, sometimes inadvertently
exacerbating the crisis, but always dealing with a
problem caused and developing elsewhere. Perhaps
a more appropriate view would be to acknowledge
that in an increasingly globalised world, these
stakeholders can be – for good or for ill – an integral
part of the famine process, interacting in complex
ways with local participants. 
These approaches also tend to isolate the famine
process, by analysing it independently of other
geo-political priorities and concerns. Famine
vulnerability is often an inadvertent (or intentional)
outcome of other, more highly prioritised goals (see
Devereux on economic liberalisation and bi-lateral
relations in Malawi, and Gazdar on international
sanctions in Iraq, in this Bulletin). Moreover, it is
not often recognised that individual famines have
to compete for resources and international
attention with other humanitarian crises in the
region and around the world. 
These limitations suggest that we need another
layer of analysis to complement and augment the
insights of previous theoretical approaches, in
order both to understand the persistence of famine
and to explain the emergence of ‘new’ famines.
Several articles in this Bulletin attempt to unravel
this layer, and thereby deepen our understanding
of the global dynamics that are helping to create
the conditions for increasing vulnerability to
famine in a range of countries around the world.
5 Structure of this Bulletin
The contributions to this Bulletin are loosely
clustered into ‘conceptual’, ‘case study’ and ‘issues’
articles. This Introduction is followed by two
conceptual articles. In the first, Jenny Edkins
challenges the dominant view of famine as a
technical problem amenable to ‘technologised
responses’, arguing instead that famines are ‘crimes
against humanity’, requiring political analysis and
politicised responses. In the second article, Paul
Howe isolates three sources of ambiguity in
definitions of famine – namely, its temporal (when
does a famine start and end?), scale (how many
people must be affected?), and sectoral (what is the
role of non-food issues?) boundaries – and
concludes that divergences between ‘academic’ and
‘operational’ definitions have stripped the term of
any empirical meaning in contemporary usage.
Next are nine case studies of recent famines and
‘near’ or ‘averted’ famines. Two articles examine the
complex relationship between war and famine.
Luka Biong Deng locates the root causes of the 1998
famine in southern Sudan in the British colonial
legacy, and highlights the ambiguous roles of
contemporary global actors – relief and
development agencies, multinational corporations.
This analytical approach lifts the focus above the
‘local conflict’ that is typically blamed for the
recurrent famines in Sudan since the 1980s, into
the global realm. Fiona Watson asks why no famine
struck the besieged areas of Bosnia in 1992–5 – in
contrast to several European siege famines earlier in
the twentieth century – and finds that the
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population’s vulnerability was relatively low
because of favourable pre-crisis economic,
demographic and health conditions, and because of
a disproportionately large humanitarian response.
By contrast, a major vulnerability factor in famines
that were not prevented is a sluggish donor
response, caused either by lack of credible
information or by strained relations between
governments and donors. Dan Maxwell’s analysis of
the drought-triggered famine in southern Ethiopia
in 1999–2000 suggests that the northern border
war with Eritrea, which coincided with the famine,
contributed to a climate of mistrust that ultimately
led to donor response failure. (A similar
deterioration in government–donor relations was
partly to blame for Malawi 2002, and also
characterised earlier famines such as Bangladesh
1974 and Ethiopia 1984.)
Sometimes a famine occurs without even being
noticed by outsiders, due to political isolation and
lack of information. As Michel Garenne reveals, the
‘hidden famine’ in Madagascar in 1986 was
‘discovered’ through retrospective analysis of
demographic data, a decade after the famine
occurred. (If this sounds incredible, consider that
empirical confirmation of China’s ‘Great Leap
Forward’ famine of 1959–62 became possible only
after Chinese demographic data were made
available for analysis in the 1980s.) It is quite
possible that mortality crises have occurred
involving mass starvation which have not
registered as ‘famines’, because they do not
conform to the refugee camp images that televised
famines have imprinted on the public perception.
Some famine victims may be misattributed as
civilian casualties of wars, or they may, as in
Madagascar 1986, be the dispersed victims of
economic policies that have undermined food
production and market access to food for the poor.
Some recent famines have occurred in unexpected
places. Haris Gazdar’s analysis of the famine in Iraq
during the 1990s, which was constructed by
United Nations sanctions, highlights the dangers of
global interconnectedness. This was a ‘post-
modern’ famine – one that occurred in a relatively
affluent society with strong institutions and
functioning markets – as opposed to ‘pre-modern’
famines that (still) occur in weakly integrated
subsistence-oriented economies, or ‘modern’
famines that follow sudden ‘exchange entitlement’
declines (Sen 1981). Gazdar speculates that the
famine in Iraq, which was created by the exercise of
global political leverage against a pariah state, may
have given us a glimpse of the ‘post-modern’ form
that many twenty-first century famines will take.
Another ‘globalisation’ trend evident in recent
famines is the exercise of economic leverage over
poor countries, ostensibly for their benefit but often
yielding, at least in the short-term, detrimental
outcomes. Three famines or near famines in this
collection – in Madagascar, Malawi and Mongolia –
followed periods of rapid and radical economic
reforms which were partly imposed on these
countries through donor conditionalities. In his
assessment of the Malawi 2002 food crisis, Stephen
Devereux argues that structural adjustment policies
which have systematically undermined smallholder
agriculture suggest that the diagnosis and remedies
of the Washington Consensus are fatally flawed, and
that a different model is needed to ensure food
security in countries that are economically
impoverished, institutionally weak and
environmentally vulnerable.
A similar argument could be applied to the
Madagascar famine of 1986, as discussed by Michel
Garenne, and to Hanna Siurua and Jeremy Swift’s
analysis of the ‘near famine’ in Mongolia in
1999–2002, both of which followed a radical break
from Soviet-aligned socialism and the adoption of
structural adjustment policies. Paradoxically, Siurua
and Swift find that the state pension scheme – a relic
of the socialist era – was a crucial source of support
during the recent livelihoods crises in Mongolia.
Interestingly, Christopher Eldridge’s research on
the impacts of the 1991/2 drought emergency in
southern Africa found that drought-affected people
in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe survived largely
on their own resources. Market purchases provided
3–4 times as much food as food aid, putting into
perspective donors’ claims that their intervention –
which was certainly more timely than in 2001/2 –
was instrumental in curtailing that drought’s
progress to full-blown famine. Incomes and asset
buffers of all kinds have certainly eroded during
the 1990s, heightening vulnerability to shocks.
There are other fundamental differences between
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southern Africa in 1991/2 and in 2001/2, not least
being the spread of HIV/AIDS throughout the
region and a series of transformative political and
economic policy processes that have had profound
but ambiguous results for poverty and livelihood
security.
‘Economic liberalisation’ famines, such as
Madagascar 1986 and Malawi 2002, are associated
with breakdowns of co-ordinated mechanisms for
pooling food security risks – the withdrawal of public
institutions (such as marketing parastatals that were
mandated to stabilise food prices and supplies), and
the simultaneous erosion of private mechanisms
(‘informal social security systems’) – as the ideology
of individualism spreads through a society, creating
new sources of vulnerability for those groups who
depended on these support systems. The likelihood
of this variant of the ‘new famines’ spreading and
perhaps becoming endemic in southern Africa, the
Horn and elsewhere looks, at this point,
depressingly high, as is the possibility that anxious
donors will react by institutionalising massive safety
net programmes that fail to address the root causes
of the crisis and have no obvious exit strategy.
A more encouraging narrative is provided by the
‘success story’ of Bangladesh. Carlo del Ninno, Paul
Dorosh and Nurul Islam conclude their
comparative analysis of floods and famines in
Bangladesh over the past quarter century with the
observation that market liberalisation has played a
major role in stabilising food supplies and food
prices, and that this was a major factor in reducing
vulnerability to famine in recent flood events. But
how generalisable is this finding? Liberalisation
may have worked for Bangladesh – though other
observers remain sceptical – but it caused what
might (with hindsight) be described as an
‘economic transition’ famine in Madagascar, it has
left Mongolians extremely vulnerable to livelihood
shocks, and it clearly has not (yet) delivered food
security to rural southern Africans.
The Bulletin ends with three articles that advance
positions on major issues affecting famine
vulnerability in the twenty-first century:
population growth, biotechnology, and AIDS. Tim
Dyson and Cormac Ó Gráda consider various
demographic impacts of famine, and answer the
crucial question – can the world feed itself in the
decades ahead? – broadly in the affirmative, while
raising serious concerns about food production in
sub-Saharan Africa. The final two articles temper
this optimism. Ian Scoones critically examines the
claims of agricultural biotechnology to meet the
rising global demand for food, and is sceptical
about the prospects for a ‘pro-poor biotechnology’.
Finally, Alex de Waal predicts the emergence of
‘AIDS-related national crises’ in Africa, and warns
that the governance impacts of HIV/AIDS on future
vulnerability to famine may be even more
significant than the pandemic’s demographic
impacts.
6 Conclusion
The ‘new famines’ are happening in unexpected
places, have unprecedented causes, and are more
politicised than ever before. An alternative working
title for this Bulletin was ‘The Paradox of
Persistence’, reflecting the fact that we now have
the technical capacity to prevent famines, yet they
continue to occur, because our increasing potential
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Table 1: The ‘new famines’
Processes Shocks
Political Geopolitical dynamics; Sudden deterioration in donor–government 
Marginalisation of ‘pariah’ states relations (Zimbabwe?); 
(Iran? Iraq? North Korea? Somalia?) The ‘New Wars’; 
AIDS-related governance crises
Economic ‘Marginalising globalisation’ National or regional economic crises
(Ethiopian Highlands?); (cf. East Asia 1997–8, Argentina 2002, 
The ‘new Malthusianism’ but in poorer, more vulnerable countries)
(parts of sub-Saharan Africa)
to eradicate famines goes hand in hand with an
increasing potential to cause them. Recent famines
have happened because they were not prevented
when they could (and should) have been, because
bad policies (and bad policy advice) produced
famine as an unintended by-product, or because
famine was a policy goal, successfully achieved.
Future famines will in all likelihood reflect a
combination of political and economic processes
and/or shocks (see Table 1), operating either alone
or in tandem with conventional famine triggers
such as drought.
Every famine that occurs in our globalising world
represents either a catastrophic failure or a
malevolent exercise of political will. The causes of
disrupted access to food may or may not be
‘technical’, but the causes of famine are nowadays
always political. That a ‘drought famine’ was
allowed to happen in Ethiopia in 2000 is truly – to
borrow a soundbite about Africa from Tony Blair –
‘a scar on the conscience of the world’. The
persistence of such famines, long after they ought
to have been eradicated, compounded by the
emergence of entirely new famine threats – ‘post-
modern’ famine in Iraq, ‘hidden’ famine in urban
Madagascar, ‘liberalisation’ famine in Malawi –
should motivate new thinking towards an action
plan for ending famine in the foreseeable future.
On the other hand, if famine is to be eradicated this
requires not just technical (food production and
distribution) capacity but substantially more
political will, at national and international levels,
than has been evident to date. The evidence
presented in this Bulletin suggests that some
currents of political will may be flowing in entirely
the wrong direction.
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Notes
1. This section and the next draws from Devereux
(2000), which lists the sources used in compiling
mortality estimates and comments on their
credibility. See also Dyson and Ó Gráda’s
contribution to this Bulletin, on mortality and other
demographic consequences of famine.
2. The spread of capitalism that accompanied
colonialism was no panacea for all the problems of
food insecurity and hunger that the poor faced. As
Iliffe (1987: 81) observes, ‘capitalist scarcity replaced
pre-capitalist famine’ in much of rural Africa.
3. This section is based on Howe (2002).
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